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I. — INTRODUCTION
« Free » « libre » or « open source » software (FLOSS) is software whose
source-code, which is the explicit expression of the programming work,
remains openly accessible. until recently, it was considered that FLOSS only
concerned programmers interested in building and sharing a base of programs
developed for their own needs (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003 ; Lakhani and
Wolf, 2005 ; Demazière et al., 2006). Today, open source software is increa-
singly integrated into many commercial offers (e.g., Novell buying Ximian and
SuSe, Sun open-sourcing its operating system, IBM open-sourcing its deve-
lopment tool software eclipse, and even Microsoft, who recently decided to
distribute some of its software products under open license (1)). Iansiti and
richards (2006) identified, amongst the various FLOSS projects, a « money-
driven cluster » where « IT vendors’ motives are economic. In this cluster,
significant investments have been made in projects that will serve as comple-
mentary assets to drive revenues to vendors’ core businesses ». Lakhani and
Wolf (2005), analyzing the results of an investigation of 684 software develo-
pers involved in 287 FLOSS projects, found that « a majority of [their] respon-
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(1) http://solutions.journaldunet.com/0404/040407_microsoft.shtml
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dents are skilled and experienced professionals working in IT-related jobs,
with approximately 40 percent being paid to participate in the FLOSS pro-
ject ».
This paradoxical situation, in which commercial business relies on the exis-
tence and durability of non-market activities, is a challenge to industrial eco-
nomic theory. It clearly has something to do with issues of « coopetition »
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996). as in any cooperative agreement devo-
ted to technology or knowledge development, agents pool assets together in a
« pre-competitive » phase and share the fruit of their efforts before returning
to competition (Crémer et  al., 1990 ; Bhattacharya and Guriev, 2006). a
FLOSS project, on the contrary, is an open game in which the list of players is
not bounded ex-ante by a cooperative agreement and the product is a public
good that cannot be privately appropriated by the players. This corresponds
more to the formation of a consortium for the production of a standard (2).
FLOSS can be considered as an extreme case of « open innovation »
(Chesbrough, 2003), defined as « a paradigm that assumes that firms can and
should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external
paths to market, as they look to advance their technology » (Chesbrough,
2006). In this paradigm, the question is to understand which part of intellec-
tual property players may have to open up and which part they must control to
build their business (Harison and Koski, 2010 ; Henkel, 2006).
In each period of the history of computers, certain players have become
dominant by controlling some specific assets while others were opened up :
with the 360 series, in the 1960s, IBM controlled the computer, but allowed a
degree of freedom in the design of independent software (and software produ-
cers) ; with the PC, Microsoft and Intel controlled (and still control) the ope-
rating system and a key hardware component, the microprocessor, but the desi-
gn of the machine was opened up and allowed competition in that part of the
market. Can FLOSS be considered as a new form of industrial organization for
the computer industry? If so, which asset(s) should FLOSS-based computer
firms control ?
Industrial economic theory (Shepherd, 1990) explains that an industry is
characterized by the basic conditions of each kind of activity : characteristics
of the products, of the users – hence of the demand – but also of the legal envi-
ronment (intellectual property protection, for instance). These basic conditions
shape the main aspects of the market structure (source of added value, compe-
titive advantages, barriers to entry) and the nature of the competition (firms’
behavior in terms of price, position, etc.) The efficiency of the firms (their per-
(2) What we mean is that a player offers a standard by developing software that the other
players can adopt and help to develop. This «unilateral» adoption is usually called ‘band-
wagon’ in the literature on standards (see for instance Farrell and Saloner, 1985). 
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formance) depends on their strategy (behavior, organization) being well-adap-
ted to the market structure, and on their capacity to reshape this market struc-
ture – by increasing the barriers to entry, for instance (Tirole, 1989).
More precisely, however, this has to do with Teece’s theory of technological
innovation and which part of « specialized assets », more or less dependent on
the innovation, a firm must control to succeed on the market (Teece, 1986). In
fact, we argue that FLOSS corresponds to the emergence in the computer
industry of the problem of managing what Teece et al. (1997) called « dyna-
mic capabilities », i.e., the continuous evolution of demand and innovation (3).
So in this article, we propose a global analysis of the computer industry and
its evolution to explain the emergence of FLOSS as a form of industrial orga-
nization, before looking at firms’ business to identify the particular asset firms
sell in a FLOSS environment.
The article is organized as follows : in section 2 we look at FLOSS on a
« macro » industrial level, to determine what, in the history of the computer
industry and its evolution, can explain the diffusion of FLOSS. In section 3 we
discuss the place of FLOSS as a source of competitive advantage and we intro-
duce the role of the users. In section 4 we discuss of the variety of involve-
ments of firms in FLOSS and how their level and mode of involvement can be
explained by the type of users likely to be found in each sub-sector of the IT
industry. Then we conclude on perspectives for open innovation regimes.
II. — THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY
1. Characteristics of the evolution
The evolution of the computer industry since its emergence in the middle of
the last century has been studied by Genthon (1995), Dréan (1996), Langlois
and Mowery (1996), Mowery (1996) and Steinmueller (1996). We can distin-
guish three main periods, each starting with a new technology that made pos-
sible the design of a new offer for new users. But in each case, the owner of
the key asset of the technology was dominant. Zimmermann (1995) and
Gérard-varet and Zimmermann (1985) distinguished three stages in the
construction of a complex good : the components (called « elementary techno-
logies »), which are used to create « generic products » or platforms, which
have to be tuned to meet certain uses (called « characteristics of use »). The
passage from one stage to another is a technological act that must be indus-
(3) Dynamic capability is defined as «the firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure
internal and external competences to address rapidly changing environments» (Teece et
al., 1997).
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trialized. The first (from component to product) is called « technologies of
architecturing » and the second (from generic product to usable product) is cal-
led « technologies of use ». The history of the computer industry is the story
of the successive emergence of the dominant design and of the industrial orga-
nization to produce it for these two « technological acts ».
A dominant technological concept for a dominant demand...
In the first period (mid 1940s to mid 1960s), there was no real differentiation
between hardware and software, and computers were ’unique’. They were
research products, built for a unique project. In this pre-paradigmatic stage, the
users were of the « von Hippel » type (that we denote vH), who may act as
« sources of innovation » (von Hippel, 1988, 1986), able to contribute to hard-
ware development by proposing improvements or modifications, developing it
by themselves or at least able to design the technical specifications.
In the second period (early 1960s to early 1980s), thanks to technological
progress (miniaturization of transistors, compilers and operating systems), the
scope of use extended in two directions : a reduction in the size and price of
computers, which increased the number of organizations able to afford them,
and an increase in computing capacities, allowing the same computer to serve
different uses. But the main evolution was initiated by IBM, with the release
of the 360 series, the first family of computers sharing the same operating sys-
tem. This was the first dominant design of the industry. The computer had
become a « classical » good, to be changed once no longer efficient or too old,
but without losing investments made in software, because as the program
evolves, grows in size, or serves a growing number of users, you only have to
move to more powerful hardware.
This allowed computers to reach a new category of the demand, by beco-
ming tools for the centralized processing of information for organizations (sta-
tistics, payment of salaries, etc.), firms. and over the course of this period, the
size of organizations having access to this tool decreased. users were no lon-
ger able to contribute to the hardware, but they developed strong skills in soft-
ware development.
The third period began in the late 1970s, with the arrival of the micropro-
cessor. The dominant technological concept and design were in the organiza-
tion of PC production, where the hardware architecture has been made public
and open for competition, but with one single operating system and micropro-
cessor. This proved to be the most efficient way to meet demand in terms of
both innovation and price : there are less compatibility problems with pro-
grams that are designed for one single architecture, but users are no longer tied
to one computer producer, and that increases the competition. The second evo-
lution in design is « package programs ». Programs were no longer developed
for a single user, but the same program could be packaged and distributed to
different people or organizations, in the same way as for other tangible goods.
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What had happened in the previous period in terms of hardware design now
happened for software, with the emergence of a dominant design. Once again
the scope of use extended in two directions (increase in power and reduction
in size and price of low-end computers). The third period is that of personal,
firstly professional and now private information processing. Initially domina-
ted by « Kogut-Metiu users » (KM) (4), who are not able to contribute to soft-
ware development but who are innovation takers and sensitive to the technical
quality of the offer, the market has been growingly dominated by « naive
users » (N). These latter are not endowed with noticeable technical skills and
are only price sensitive (5).
Specialized assets and control of the industry
Since the computer was at that time a tool for specialists, with each project
allowing producers and users to better understand the possibilities of such
machines, the first period was dominated by learning by using, with significant
r&D costs. The more one participated in projects, the more able one became
to propose innovations for the next project, thanks to the knowledge accumu-
lated. This explains the quick emergence of seven dominant firms (in the
uSa).
In the second period, this learning-by-using effect did not disappear, as users
were able to keep their home-made programs while changing their hardware.
This possibility also created the dominant increasing return to adoption effect
(arthur, 1989) : technological interrelations. as, factually, a program was
developed for and worked with one single operating system, it became diffi-
cult for a customer to break the commercial relation, once initiated, with a pro-
ducer. In return, this customer no longer even needed to understand the hard-
ware part of the machine. The second period was initiated by IBM, and at the
end of the period, IBM was the dominant firm (even having to face an antitrust
case in the uS), although newcomers, HP and Digital, had gained significant
positions with mini-computers. If the innovation resided in the operating sys-
tem, the specialized asset of the period was the distribution network, as you
needed to convince customers to adopt your technology to develop their pro-
grams. Once that had been achieved, technological interrelations meant that
these customers would incur substantial costs if they switched to another fami-
ly run by another operating system. and with more customers, not only could
they invest more in r&D to develop the efficiency of their computer family,
but they could also spend more on marketing to capture new customers. and
the efficiency of the machines was precisely what the second-period dominant
(4) In reference to the concept of «frontier-users» proposed by Kogut and Metiu (2001). 
(5) We use here a typology of users close to the one defined by Gérard-varet and
Zimmermann (1985), distinguishing between so-called naive, sophisticated and designer
users, but here our preoccupation is rather oriented to the capability of these users to
contribute to software improvement.
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user wanted. So once again, this favored a concentration in manufacturing
business, even if on different offers.
The interrelation effect has not disappeared in the third period. But it is
dominated by economy of scope, principally because of the development of
standardized programs, running on few architectures, reducing development
costs (on that particular point, see Mowery, 1996). Of course, as in the pre-
vious period, the winners in the computer segment were those who controlled
the key elements of the computer, central in terms of technological interrela-
tion : operating systems still, but also micro-processors. They were the compa-
nies that benefited most from the economies of scale, as competition brought
prices down in other sectors, in particular for the machines which had been a
source of high profit before, but also for other components. But new winners
in software packages emerged, in more or less broad niche markets. SaP,
Oracle and Business Objects are classic examples of the successful newcomers
of this period. The access to customers and their needs was the co-specialized
asset, as computers had been in the previous period. Once the customer has
invested in a software technology, he is tied to that technology by investment
in learning. and the more customers it has, the more firms can invest in r&D
to develop the efficiency or the functionality of their platforms, and the more
they can spend on marketing to capture new customers and/or their feedback
to improve the product (6).
In a nutshell, what history teaches us is that in the computer industry, tech-
nological evolution allows the construction of new offers, new dominant desi-
gns, better-suited to meet new demand characteristics. and each time this hap-
pens, the users and their feedback are the key co-specialized asset that firms
must control to succeed in promoting offers based on new technologies. This
remains true for the computer industry of today.
2. The current industrial organization
Hardware
When speaking of computers, we think about machines that are more or less
dedicated to specific uses. at one extreme, computers can be used for a wide
scope of applications provided by the software that is acquired and installed on
them. at the other extreme, video game consoles or multimedia players are
devoted to a single range of applications. In between, mobile devices like PDas
or mobile phones are built to support a growing number of applications (7).
(6) For a detailed analysis of the strategies of these firms, see Cusumano (2004).
(7) This distinction between specialized and generalist devices is evolving, as Sony intends its
PS3 to be the home media center. But this has not so far impacted on the industrial struc-
ture. 
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°136, 4ème trimestre 2011 45
vertical competitive advantage is given by better performances/cost ratios
(for instance cheaper laptops or better computation capacities for servers or
high quality laptops), while horizontal differentiation is based on the integra-
tion of new features and high performance tools (e.g. Samsung’s folding cell
phone display), or on market segmentation through hard-soft-content bundling
on new features or applications (e.g. « Mario Brothers » video games only
being available on Nintendo machines).
But in terms of the purpose of these machines, and thus the skill of the
people buying them, the structure of the markets and of the competition varies.
We will take the example of the computer market to illustrate this.
1. Servers are intended to manage, deliver and protect information on the
networks. They must be high-performance, stable and compatible with net-
work standards. They are bought by vH users. Microcomputers (with a gro-
wing market share for laptop computers) are bought by end users, mainly as
personal computers. In the server market, several unix systems still exist, and
this is a case of horizontal differentiation as they are not compatible, so users
have to choose between them. For high end customers or needs, mainframes
still exist with dedicated operating systems. In the case of the open source
unix, some users prefer BSD (free, open or net) to Linux.
So even if a growing share of the market is supplied by PC servers running
either Linux or Microsoft, it is clear that quality, purpose and niche market
strategies are possible, because users are able to evaluate the performance and
the suitability to their needs, and are ready to pay for that.
2. In the personal computer market, apple has a marginal market share, as
does Linux, and the Windows-Intel couple dominates the market. IBM sold its
PC division to Lenovo in 2004, because it was no longer profitable after
Compaq cut prices in the mid 1990s, and the difficulties of Dell today (8)
prove that the PC market is dominated by a price war. This is not surprising,
as the dominant user is naive and thus only price sensitive.
The consequence is that firms are continuously seeking to reduce their costs
and prices, as it is difficult for them to differentiate horizontally.
Software and service
Today, according to Cusumano (2004, chap. 2), the application market can
be divided into service and product, and for the product side into business spe-
cialized offers (which we will call « package offers ») and global, « platform
offers ». We will follow this distinction.
(8) http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Infotech/Hardware/Dell_may_sell_its_plants_
worldwide_reports/articleshow/3449300.cms
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Package offers
The practice of combined offers, or packages, integrating a standard base
and customized services has made its mark in the field of professional solu-
tions, for company management systems (erP, whose symbolic model is
SaP), IT tools (« middleware » applications, compilers, development tools
such as those proposed by the Ilog company), and the solutions specific to a
branch or profession (such as the subsequent version of computer-aided desi-
gn proposed by the company Dassault Systems).
The producer sells « three a services » (Jullien and Zimmermann, 2006) :
quality assurance, adaptation (more or less fast) to the user’s needs, and
assistance with using the tool. This is the model of « sustained technical capa-
city » (Delaunay and Gadray, 1992 ; Gadray, 1996). The core competence of
the firm here is to make the product evolve following line with the needs of the
users, but to make this evolution « sustainable » (i.e., ensuring the product
remains appropriable and bug-free). If these tools are professional, users are
skilled enough to express their requirements (for instance, if they are doctors,
that the product is up to date regarding drugs and drug interactions). But they
are not always skilled enough in computer science to develop these require-
ments by themselves, or even to translate them into tender specifications. Here,
it is the content of the users’ feedback that may vary according to their com-
puter skills.
Platform manufacturers
They are probably the most studied. These software publishers have broade-
ned the scope of their offer either by supplying a variety of application tools
that can be combined with their core product or by offering multiple versions
of the latter. This enables them to better meet users’ specific needs while kee-
ping production costs down. The archetypal example of such a « platform stra-
tegy » is Microsoft, which now offers different versions of its operating sys-
tem for servers, corporate users and private individuals, as does its open-sour-
ce competitor redHat. The same kind of strategy is followed by Oracle, which
sells professional applications developed on its database technology, and
which has recently bought Bea and SuN, after other takeovers, to enlarge its
applications portfolio. another example is provided by Symbian in the field of
operating systems (OS) for mobile applications.
In a nutshell, they are involved in a classic arbitration over standards (9) : to
attract the maximum number of users to the platform in order to attract the maxi-
mum number of application producers, and vice versa. The history of Linux dis-
tribution publishers is another example of the importance of user skills in the
(9) On standard theories, see the discussions by Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986, 1994), Teece
(1986), Langlois and robertson (1992, 1995), and for a review of literature, West (2003,
2004).
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creation of a market. redHat, SuSe and Mandriva (formally Mandrakesoft)
were among the first commercial players to enter the market using FLOSS. This
could be seen as obvious on a mass market with rather naive users and signifi-
cant price-based competition. But today, the retail store sales of OS packages
represent a negligible part of the revenue of such firms (10) and a major share is
targeted on the industrial market. This can be explained by the development of
broadband connection. But more than that, user skills matter. PCs are shipped
with a pre-installed OS, and few buyers are skilled enough to install a different
one. and they have little incentive to do so, since the existing OS has already
been paid for with the computer. On the emerging OS for PC/server market,
things work differently. Most of the users, of vH or KM type, are aware of the
technical issues involved in installing and configuring an OS. It is also easier to
buy a machine without an operating system installed. FLOSS gives them access
to a more open and more adaptable unix-like operating system than they could
find in the traditional unix offer, and they are able to choose the unix they pre-
fer. So, even if they are less price sensitive, FLOSS-based servers may help to
differentiate vertically (better quality over price ratio) and horizontally (with the
existence of niche unix).
Service companies
The largest ones (IBM, Cap Gemini) endeavor to develop a global approach
to IS and company organization (by acquiring strategic consultancy companies
such as ernst & Young for Cap Gemini), while remaining less dependent on
one type of software, so as to be able to adapt to the constraints and to the cur-
rent circumstances of these customers. But the retail service companies beha-
ve in the same way, supplying infrastructure on a smaller, more local scale
(maintenance of a single server, instead of a global infrastructure), either at a
more specialized level, for example in terms of sector (e.g. maintenance ser-
vices for the food-processing industry), or on a more reduced software base
(distributors-installers-adapters of one of the platforms ; these are Microsoft,
Oracle, or redHat « certified » companies). The vocation of all these compa-
nies is to develop, in the customer’s interest, individualized solutions and to
support these solutions.
We are approaching what Delaunay and Gadray (1992) and Gadray (1996)
described as the « provision of human capacities », in the sense that what
makes their singularity (or their core competence) is that they bring together a
team of specialists not only in different software but also in their customers’
activities. In the following, we will call this « architect strategy ». In other
words, the efficiency of these firms lies in producing tender specifications that
(10) redHat stopped this activity (see financial report 2006, p. 31); the consumer market
(including distributors, OeM sales, e-commerce and Club) represented 2.54 million euros
(45% of the total earnings) showing a 23.4% decrease for Mandriva in the 2005-2006 fis-
cal year; SuSe has been bought by Novell, so these revenues are diluted. 
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meet their clients’ needs. If these companies are technical agnostics, in that
they have to install the tools their clients need (or want), it is obvious that the
greater their mastery of a tool, the easier its adaptation is and the easier their
job is. This widens the strategy field, as firms may differentiate vertically
(increasing the number of tools mastered or the number of professional
domains covered), but also horizontally, specializing in one domain or softwa-
re, as do SaP consultants. But in any case, once again, the more computer-
skilled their clients are, the easier the discussion will be (De Bandt, 1998).
actually, the Internet has already impacted these specializations, pushing
firms to include more services in their offers or even to design new ways of
selling software-based applications, such as SaaS (software as a service)
(Cusumano, 2004, pp. 86-127 ; Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz, 2007).
3. Internet innovation, a new phase for the industry
During the 1990s, with the arrival of the Internet, the principal technical evo-
lution in information technology was, of course, the generalization of compu-
ter networking, both inside and outside organizations. Miniaturization also led
to the appearance of a new range of « nomad » products (« organizers » (Psion
and Palm), music players, mobile phones). This is in line with the constant
evolution of information technology products. We have gone from a single
machine, dedicated to one task known in advance and reserved for the entire
organization, to multiple, linked machines which are used to carry out diffe-
rent tasks, varying over time, and which are integrated within various organi-
zations. Networking, exchanging between heterogeneous systems and com-
munication between these machines have all become crucial.
Thus, because of the spread of the Internet and the growth of exchange out-
side the organization, network externalities have become the most important
source of increasing returns to adoption.
Within client firms, the demand has become more and more heterogeneous
with the networking of various systems and the need for users working in the
firm to share the same tools. Software programs (and more particularly, soft-
ware packages) have to be adapted to the needs and knowledge of every indi-
vidual without losing the benefit of economies of scale, in other words the
standardization of the programs on which the solution is based. It is then logi-
cal that client firms should seek more open solutions, which guarantee them
greater control. For example, what the Internet did was not to offer a « proto-
col » for the simple transmission of data, since this already existed, but to offer
a protocol that was simple and flexible enough to impose itself as a standard
for exchange.
In parallel with this evolution, software program technologies have also
evolved (Horn, 2000b, pp. 126-128) : the arrival of object programming lan-
guages (C++, Java) allowed existing software components to be re-used. This
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has led to the concept of « modular software programs » : the idea is to deve-
lop an ensemble of small software programs (modules or software compo-
nents), which each have a specific function. They can be associated with and
used on any machine, since their communication interfaces are standard. What
characterizes the technological evolution of software is thus the increasing
interdependence between software programs, while the software components
that are re-used are becoming increasingly refined and specialized
(Zimmermann, 1998). This system can only function if components are indeed
re-usable, that is to say, if producers agree on a mechanism to standardize
interfaces and to ensure the stability of these standards over time.
This led Horn (2004) to assert that we have entered a new phase in produc-
tion : « mass custom-made production », increasing the service part of packa-
ged software sales. Judging by the past, this probably heralds an evolution in
the business models and structure of the industry. and as already explained
(Dang Nguyen and Pénard, 1999 ; Genthon and Phan, 1999 ; Jullien, 1999), the
spread of FLOSS is consubstantial with the spread of the Internet.
III. — FLOSS AS THE NEW FRONTIER FOR THE COMPUTER
INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION?
FLOSS can be a source of competitive advantage for firms that take part in
or lead its development, but the nature and level of these firms’ involvement
varie considerably from one market segment to another. Our main argument
here is that this variation can be explored by taking into account the characte-
ristics of the consumers addressed in each market segment, and more particu-
larly their level of skill. The more skilled the users are, the easier it is to intro-
duce horizontal differentiation to meet their needs more precisely, thus crea-
ting niche markets. Conversely, when users are too computer illiterate, com-
petition is restricted to prices and this limits firms’ investment.
Internet tools were developed in universities, and distributed under free
licenses (BSD, for the most) : NCSa Web server, the apache ancestor,
Sendmail, Bind... at the beginning of the spread of the Internet within organi-
zations (firms, administrations), servers were installed by engineers who had
discovered these tools at university, sometimes without any significant budget.
They installed what they knew at the lowest cost : FLOSS products. apache for
Web server, PHP or Python as language for dynamic Web pages are still the
leading tools in their branch for Internet application.
1. Specific advantages for mass custom-made production
FLOSS has specific advantages regarding the evolution of demand, impro-
ving quality and meeting norms.
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Software quality
More than mere public research products, FLOSS programs were, first and
foremost, tools developed by user-experts, to meet their own needs. The low
quality of closed software packages and, especially, the difficulty of making
them evolve was one of the fundamental reasons for richard Stallman’s ini-
tiative (11). These user-experts are behind many libre software development
initiatives (including Linux, apache and Samba) and their improvement. and
as far as these flagship software programs are concerned, this form of organi-
zation has obtained remarkable results in term of quality and quick improve-
ments (12).
This is undoubtedly due to the free availability of the sources, allowing
skilled users to test the software programs, to study their code and to correct it
if they find errors. The higher the number of contributors, the greater the chan-
ce that one of them will find any error that may exist, and will know how to
correct it. But libre programs are also tools (languages) and programming rules
that make this reading possible. all this helps to guarantee minimum thre-
sholds of robustness for the software.
Other widely distributed libre programs are program development tools
(compilers, such as GCC C/C++ compiler, development environment, such as
emacs or eclipse). The reasons are threefold : they are tools used by computer
professionals who are able and willing to develop or adapt their working tools,
they are the first tools you need to develop software programs, and their effi-
ciency is very important for program efficiency. That is why FSF’s first pro-
ducts were such programs, and particularly the GCC compiler.
Meeting norms
Co-operative work and the fact that the software programs are often a col-
lection of simultaneously evolving small-scale projects, also requires that the
communication interface should be made public and « normalized » (13).
(11) Stallman «invented» the concept of FLOSS, with the creation of the GNu/GPL license
and of the Free Software Foundation, the organization which produces them; see
http://www.fsf.org/gnu/thegnuproject.html. See http://www.gnu.org/prep/standards.html
for technical recommendations on how to program GNu software.
(12) On the structure of libre development, besides raymond (1998b, 1999), one can also refer
to Lakhani and von Hippel (2003). See Tzu-Ying and Jen-Fang (2004) for a survey and an
analysis of the efficiency of on-line user communities, Bessen (2002) and Baldwin and
Clark (2003) for a theoretical analysis of the impact of libre code architecture on the effi-
ciency of libre development. The latter argue that libre may be seen as a new development
«institution» (pp. 35 et seq.).
(13) In the sense that they respect public formats whose evolution is decided collectively. 
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Open codes make it easier to check this compatibility and, if need be, to
modify the software programs. It is also remarkable that, in order to avoid the
reproduction of diverging versions of unix, computer firms have set up orga-
nizations to guarantee the compatibility of the various versions and distribu-
tion of Linux. They also publish technical recommendations on how to pro-
gram the applications so that they can work with this system in the same spi-
rit as the POSIX standard (14). Firms use libre programs as professional tools
to collectively coordinate the creation of components and software program
bricks which are both reliable and, especially, « normalized ». up to now, this
collective, normalized base has been lacking within the information technolo-
gy industry (Dréan, 1996). This normalization of the components used to build
« mass custom-made products » should help to improve the quality of this pro-
duction, because the services based on them may be of better quality.
Based on the historical evolution of the computer industry, there are conver-
gent signs suggesting that FLOSS is the industrial organization « of the
Internet years », on the condition that firms develop sustainable business, com-
patible with the way communities work. In the last decade, an abundant and
growing literature has discussed this question.
2. Floss involvement and the role of users
Since the mid-1990s, a growing number of commercial firm, either new
entrants or incumbents, have decided to integrate FLOSS products in their own
specific offer or toolboxes, even investing by different means in FLOSS deve-
lopment. Of course these new emerging strategies must be understood in the
light of IP protection prevailing in each market segment and the need to streng-
then competitive advantages or to rely on new ones.
regarding the degree of involvement in FLOSS dynamics, the more active
actors seem to be found in sectors where software development and use is
either a core activity or a crucial condition for performances, as it is the case
for server manufacturers or architects of information systems (adoption of
Linux by IBM, HP since the beginning of the years 2000). at the other extre-
me, the weakest involvement is found amongst hardware suppliers that can
only feel concerned by FLOSS for compatibility and price purposes.
When FLOSS adoption is related to marginal aspects of differentiation, it
seems to have little impact on industrial structure and competition. This is
generally the case for most of hardware producers, when hard-soft-content is
(14) This is the Free Standards Group (http://www.freestandards.org/). Members of this com-
mittee include: red Hat, Mandriva, SuSe/Novell, va Software, Turbo Linux, IBM, SuN,
Dell, etc.
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no longer bundled (servers, computers, Personal Communication Tools, DvD
and MP3 players...) 
Surprisingly, FLOSS diffusion impacts mainly firms in software based
industries. This has to be understood regarding how their core competences
have evolved and shifted significantly. Their main challenge is less and less to
supply a « software solution » to a given problem at a given time, but increa-
singly to deal with short to long term uncertainty over IT system production
and management. users ask for solutions able to protect them against uncer-
tainty, granting interoperability, bug resolution, the satisfaction of new needs
and the integration of technical advances. The trade-off between available
solutions is not posed in terms of their cost of acquisition but of their « TCO »
(total cost of ownership), in which the future costs and the costs for granting
interoperability and adaptability have to be estimated. This is precisely what
architects, business programs and platform producers sell to skilled users,
aware of these problems and signals. On these markets the FLOSS organiza-
tion seems to represent an asset for producers, who can display their involve-
ment and succeed in building sustainable business models (see the examples
of redHat, MySQL or, in France Linagora). But, as explained before, this is
only an asset if the market regards FLOSS as providing a value added to the
product, i.e. if this brings the users a potential for increasing their utility.
How and why may those different users contribute directly or indirectly to
FLOSS projects ? First of all, contribution does not necessary imply code deve-
lopment but can take various forms in the product development and improve-
ment. users have to be considered as valuable « sources of innovation » (von
Hippel, 1988), not only for program testing and debugging but also for impro-
ving the product usability and performances. People decide to contribute if they
get interested by the product, or if they have a problem, in which case they can
either report the problem directly or through an intermediary, the supplier for
instance, that allows the user to pass from a passive to an active use of the pro-
ject.
actually, the users, understood as the persons choosing the solution (thus not
always being the « end-users »), are rather different from one market to ano-
ther, causing the competitive advantage to rely on different features.
Let us distinct three main types of users according to their relation to the pro-
duct and the technology (Zimmermann 1995, Kogut and Metiu 2001, von
Hippel 1988, 1996). The first is the category of « Naïve customers or users »
(that we denote N) who are not endowed with noticeable technical skills and
do not individually weigh very much in economic terms. The second is the
category of « Kogut-Metiu users » (KM) (15) who are not able to contribute
to software development but can generate new features or innovations by
(15) In reference to the notion of « frontier-users » put forward by Kogut and Metiu (2001).
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revealing their own needs. above all, they represent an irreplaceable testing
and debugging base. KM users are sensitive to price and quality arguments.
The third category is that of the « von Hippel users » (vH) who act as
« sources of innovation » (von Hippel, 1988) able to contribute to software
development by proposing improvements or modifications, developing it by
themselves or at least able to design the technical specifications.
users play a double role, deriving from both their economic and technical
standing. Depending on the market, and especially their bargaining power in
it, the users are more or less able to select the (technical) offers. at one extre-
me, users and contracts in the global service/architects market are related to
large structures, with substantial buying capacities and generally endowed
with significant technical skills. So they are likely to influence economic and
technical choices. at the other extreme low price computers address a mass
market where individual users, in their vast majority have little budget and/or
few skills. Their influence on market evolution is negligible at an individual
level but of global importance in terms of elasticity to prices. But this analysis
should be nuanced in the case of intermediation by a « prescriber », who orders
and defines the characteristics for a large number of machines, destined for
mass distribution by his own means (local government for secondary schools
in France (16), education in rural area in developing countries (17),...). That’s
the reason why, when speaking about the « user », we mean the person who
negotiates or chooses the characteristics of the good, who is not always the end
user.
Of course different types of users are co-existing in any given market. But
the dispersion of users’ skills in the related technology and more particularly
in software doesn’t follow the same distribution from one segment to another.
even if skilled users are likely to be found in any market, they may represent
a too small share to play a significant role in it and catch the interest of the
concerned firms for their specific demand. Conversely, thanks to the Internet,
a handful of very talented users around the world can weigh enough together
to develop a FLOSS alternative to private offers and contribute to the emer-
gence of a FLOSS business offer. So, what we denote users’ skills appears as
a subtle mix between competences and number, from which could yield a
weighted sum of competences.
What seems clear from a rather qualitative analysis, and was formally
demonstrated in Jullien and Zimmermann (2009), is that the skill of the users
matters for understanding the level of firms’ involvement in FLOSS. When
users are naïve, firms may use FLOSS, but only for price reasons, in the same
(16) With the aim to provide «a computer for each pupil»: http://www.ordina13.com/, http://
www.ordi35.fr/
(17) See, for instance, the competition between Microsoft and Mandriva to supply 17,000 com-
puters in Nigeria. http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/government-law/
public-sector/news/index.cfm?newsid=6124
54 REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°136, 4ème trimestre 2011
way as they could use freeware. The more vH the users are, the more complex
the strategies involving FLOSS, and the greater firms’ involvement and parti-
cipation. In some cases, when users are vH, firms may even produce FLOSS
and lead the community, as do ada Core Technology for ada 2005 and
MySQL aB for MySQL data bases. But in any case, FLOSS is regarded as
open source software. This means that firms use FLOSS for technical reasons
(sustainability, flexibility) and for innovative reasons (increasing the speed and
quality of feedback).
IV. — WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THE MARKETS?
as seen before, there is a wide diversity of actors in the industry in terms of
both products and size. Successive waves of innovations and company strate-
gies have led to a progressive reshaping of the industry borders and structure.
For example, Internet has impacted the software production, pushing firms to
integrate more services in their offers, designing new ways of selling software
bases applications, such as Saas (software as a service) (Cusumano, 2004,
pp. 86-127; Campbell-Kelly & Garcia-Swartz, 2007). However, the founda-
tions of the industry have remained unchanged, since those described by
Gérard-varet & Zimmermann (1985), Zimmermann (1995), Steinmueller
(1996), and Cusumano (2004) : IT products are built by assembling hardware
and software units in a given architecture, and these products (isolated or inte-
grated into networks) are used as parts of information systems and solutions.
On the basis of such technical organization, it is then possible to distinguish
three large types of « vertical specialization » : i. component producers,
ii. computers and IT devices suppliers, iii. software editors and service com-
panies providing applications.
all these segments are concerned with software production, as even chipset
manufacturers have to deal with the operating systems embedded in the machi-
ne integrating their component. They provide drivers for these operating sys-
tems, and their incentive to use and develop FLOSS drivers for free operating
systems (such as Linux) is a growing function of such systems market size.
Since the beginning of the 2000’s, some firms like aTI indeed offer such com-
patible drivers. But, this remains a marginal contribution, and should not have
any immediate serious impact on the structure of the FLOSS development
organization. So we will not investigate further the strategies towards FLOSS
in this segment of the industry.
remain what is traditionally defined as the hardware part (the machines) and the
software part (software and services), with, in between, the operating system.
1. The hardware
Hardware is increasingly various, from mainframes to netbooks, and from
dedicated devices (personal communication tools, video game or music
players) to the « swiss knife machines » which are modern computers.
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Looking at these markets from the dominant user skill prism helps to unders-
tand the adoption of FLOSS within the industry.
1. In the servers market, producers have habitually provided proprietary
solutions with proprietary unix (18). Here suppliers are dealing with highly-
skilled vH clients that can make an essential contribution in the context of
FLOSS opening. The rise of PC servers has permitted some users to avoid such
a bundling problem; moreover, using Linux allows a cheaper offer (vertical
advantage) reusing unix programs (content) portfolio. Thus some firms have
been able to widen the servers market from vH users capable of managing
their systems by themselves to KM clients, sensitive to prices, but also to the
quality of a PC server fitted out with Linux. So new entries have been expe-
rienced like the Cobalt (19) one, but the main actors of the unix « world » have
also rapidly developed their own offers, cutting down the sources of vertical
differentiation (20).
2. The segment of netbooks, and low price computers (LPC) is a mass mar-
ket where naïve clients are the driving force behind demand, and competition
is overall based on prices. When asus entered the market with its eee-PC, it
used Linux for price reasons, because Microsoft Windows vista was too cost-
ly in terms of resources needed and price to be competitive. Since, considering
the success of this market, Microsoft has designed a specific, downgraded ver-
sion of Windows XP for these computers (21). It is worth noting that, since the
middle of 2007, Dell proposes ubuntu Linux distribution on one of its first
price laptops (22).
3. Between these two cases there is the high quality computers (HQC) mar-
ket, i.e. computers for firms or computers used to play games, computers
requiring good, up-to-date performances. In that segment, exigent users, or
frontier KM users seem to be dominant. It is worth noting that in this desktop
market, the main push in favour of open source, for the time being, is driven
by organizations or institutions (which we consider as vH users) that take
decisions to equip a large number of end-users. examples are the French
« assemblée nationale » (French Congress) that has contracted with a service
(18) See West (2003) for a full discussion of FLOSS strategies in that sector .
(19) Cobalt was bought by SuN, which dissolved the products into its own offer. See
http://www.sun.com/hardware/serverappliances/eol.html
(20) It is worth noting that, on the contrary, SuN, being the leader on the uNIX market, has
been reluctant to adopt Linux and is today the server constructor which has the most dif-
ficulties to adapt its business model, with recurrent losses.
(21) eee-PC has been the «most wanted 2007 Christmas gift», according to the constructor,
http://eeepc.asus.com/global/
(22) http://www.dell.com/content/topics/segtopic.aspx/linux_3x?c=us&cs=19&l=en&s=dhs
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company to install Linux on all the computers provided to MPs (23), or the ini-
tiatives of the Nigerian (24) and Macedonian (25) governments for schools, or
in the industry, the French automaker Peugeot (26).
So, today, HQC producers may find it hard to switch from Windows to
Linux, because this would mean either acquiring new skills (OS management
and improvement), or sub-contracting this maintenance to Linux editors
(redHat, SuSe,...) which may lead to another dependence and to conflict rela-
tions with the dominant provider. Nevertheless, a possible future evolution in
this sense is likely to arise from the pressure of corporate and vH customers
becoming more aware of the potentialities of switching to FLOSS. It is worth
noting that the Linux offered by HP is part of the enterprise offers branch (27).
In the near future most of the HQCs will probably switch to debundling their
machines from the associated OS, to segment more their offer between vH
users with Linux and KM users with Windows.
4. Dedicate digital devices represent another intermediate case with less
skilled customers (KM+N) and a weak degree of involvement on the part of
commercial actors into FLOSS, and mainly for compatibility and absorptive
capacity purpose.
at one extreme, in the games consoles segment but also to a lesser extent in
the music player market, proprietary formats have introduced a strong bundle
of hardware-software-content and FLOSS products are non-existent. Thanks
to the MP3 standard or new existing or emerging open standards like Ogg, new
entries are always possible in segments like the music players market, but the
main actors, like apple, remain on a strict proprietary strategy. On the contra-
ry, barriers remain high on the video game players market due to the scarcity
of independent games capable of running on Linux, unlike the PS2, Xbox and
other proprietary standards games. Moreover, when they exist, such games
seem harder to obtain for simple users.
On the contrary, there are lots of FLOSS products for Personal
Communication Tools, or Mobile Computers (28). Some are proposed by vH
users, other by the constructors :
— if the leader, Nokia only sold an Internet tablet based on Linux and a
development community (29), there are lots of open-source projects around
(23) http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/software/0,39044164,61970345,00.htm
(24) http://www.zdnet.co.uk/talkback/0,1000001161,39290511-39001070c-20088736o,00.htm
(25) http://www.linuxtoday.com/infrastructure/2007091902626NWDPPB
(26) http://www.informationweek.com/news/management/showarticle.jhtml?articleID= 201400082
(27) http://h71028.www7.hp.com/enterprise/cache/309906-0-0-0-121.html
(28) See, for instance, http://tuxmobil.org/ a web site dedicated to Linux and mobile computers.
(29) Nokia 770 Internet Tablet: http://www.nokiausa.com/770/1,7841,feat:1,00.html.
Development community: http://www.maemo.org/
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(30) In June 2008, Nokia announced to be acquiring the whole share of Symbian and open
source it under eclipse license. See the Symbian foundation Web site: http://www.sym-
bianfoundation.org/
(31) http://linuxdevices.com/news/NS2854558742.html
(32) Palm and Linux: http://news.com.com/2102-1041_3-6175171.html?tag=st.util.print. The
web site dedicated by Palm to open source: http://www.palmsource.com/opensource/.
(33) redHat stopped this activity (see financial report 2006, p. 31); the consumer market
(including distributors, OeM sales, e-commerce and Club) represented 2.54M€ (45% of
the total earnings) showing a 23.4% decrease for Mandriva 2005-2006 fiscal year; SuSe
has been bought by Novell, so these revenues are diluted.
Symbian (partly owned by Nokia, partly by Sony-ericsson) (30), mainly dedi-
cated to tools for developing applications (libraries, development tools, etc.)
and Samsung proposes the first smart phones based on Linux (31) ;
— the PDa Operating system editor Palmsource is working on the integra-
tion of its product on a Linux kernel on its products (32).
For the same reasons as for PC computers, we hardly see naïve or KM people
switch from an installed operating system to a FLOSS one. So constructors will
continue to drive the market and decide what they integrate in their offer.
Implementing Linux on PCT devices may appear as a good strategy to limit dif-
ferentiation to the core competences of the manufacturers. Operating systems are
not at the heart of the products differentiation which is more based on ergono-
mic aspects and hardware characteristics. In the absence of a still established de
facto standard, as it stands in the PC market, Linux is to be considered by PCT
suppliers, as it is free of charge and benefits from a community of developer-
users capable to develop new features and new products outside any proprietary
control. In fact, similarly to the PC market, the challenge is the choice of a plat-
form (Operating System) to build the product. Palm is also a good example of a
company which after having sold its OS division, is now turning toward Linux.
2. The soft,ware
1. In the software platform market, the Linux distribution market is another very
good illustration of the key role of the demand. Linux publishers, like redHat,
SuSe, Mandriva (formally Mandrakesoft), have been among the first commercial
actors to enter the market using FLOSS. This could appear to be obvious on a
mass market with rather naïve users and a significant price-based competition.
But today, the retail store sales of OS packages represent a negligible part of the
revenue of such firms (33), and a major part is targeted to the business market.
One might explain this fact by the development of broadband connection
thanks to aDSL. But we believe a more important explanation lies on the skills
of the users and on the construction of the offer. Consumers buy computers
with already installed OS and few of them are skilled enough to install a dif-
ferent one. additionally there are no incentives to do so because the pre-ins-
talled OS has already been paid for with the computer. So, the diffusion of
FLOSS OS on desktop/laptop PCs depends more on the strategies of construc-
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tors, as discussed above, than on direct installation by users. and for vH
people wanting to install Linux on their PC, others, more technically oriented
distributions exist, like Debian, and there is no need to pay for these distribu-
tions, available for download on the Web.
On the emerging OS for PC server market, things work differently. Most of
the users, of vH or KM type, are aware of the technical questions involved in
installing and configuring an OS. It is also easier to buy a machine without an
operating system installed, and the relative price of the OS is lower. FLOSS
gives them access to a cheaper but also more open and more adaptable unix-
like operating system, than they could find in the traditional unix offer. This
gave FLOSS OS publishers an undeniable competitive advantage, at least until
that server constructors started to offer PC servers with Linux.
2. In the business software market, the more skilled the users are, in terms of
software development skills, and (although this is a lesser driving force) in
terms of expressing functionality requirements, the more FLOSS concepts and
industrial related offers are likely to spread.
It is clear that the use of open source business software, enabling savings on
the cost of licenses, offers a price advantage. Moreover, the fact that the custo-
mer can evaluate the product without buying a license is also an advantage in
terms of dissemination. It may even be compulsory when dominant players
already exist on the market (such as the database market where MySQL pro-
poses software products competing against those of Oracle, IBM and Microsoft
who represent more than 80 % of the market) or when customers are highly sen-
sitive to price (such as the erP market which increasingly concerns SMes and
where open-source products like erP5 or tiny erP are now available). This
strategy also enables the association of a corporate brand with a product, there-
fore increasing the notoriety of the firm through distribution of the latter.
Moreover, on these technical markets, especially when the customers are deve-
lopers, availability of the code promotes cooperation. The producer approves the
contributions, ensures stability of the tool and helps developers to use it. If an
individual contributor becomes important (in terms of contribution volume/qua-
lity/innovative aspect), he may be hired by the producer, with reduced recruit-
ment costs and risks (aCT or MySQL but also some small services companies
are using this method). By contributing to innovation, the developers (and pos-
sibly companies using the tool), are therefore guaranteed that their needs will be
taken into account more quickly and integrated into the product (which is a fun-
damental factor in reducing costs, according to von Hippel 1988).
Obviously, capitalizing on existing products is more difficult, even if, as
Muselli (2004) explained, with the entire control of the software, a dual license
strategy can be set up to sell the program when requested by the customers
(because, for example, they want to integrate it in a larger, closed, package). This
is what companies like Qt or MySQL offer. But, today, the main source of reve-
nue again comes from services, more precisely what we call the « 3a services »
(assistance, assurance and adaptation to the use). Otherwise, adaptation services
must be significant enough to finance development of the product. Therefore, the
objective is to transform a handicap (significant investments) into a commercial
REVUE D’ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE — n°136, 4ème trimestre 2011 59
advantage, by increasing the business feedback from users and by considering
openness as a way to reduce transaction costs and to signal quality. Currently, the
main evolution for those firms is to switch from a demand pull strategy (functio-
nalities are developed to stimulate/create the demand) to an « on-demand » deve-
lopment (development when required and paid for or carried out by the users).
This explains why open source business products are developed mainly in
« business » software (erP, computer infrastructure software like compilers),
where users ready to pay for configuration, maintenance or assistance services
are numerous. But the scope could easily extend to many technical/professio-
nal software activities.
3. as far as the services of the « architects » market are concerned, as Horn
(2004) points out, assembling components requires access to the source codes
(problem of compatibility), and their adaptation to different needs (from users
and other components). They must be available in the form of open-source
software (therefore legally modifiable).
The competitive advantage in using free software, in addition to price, is the-
refore the ability to offer an assembled set of components with greater inter-
operability, which should increase the quality of the final product, on a market
where the quality of services is one of the recurrent problems (see De Bandt,
1998). revenues are generated by assembling and adaptation services, as is the
case for any traditional service company.
The only uncertainty about the model concerns the availability of the com-
ponents : who will develop them and who will maintain them? Moreover, the
customers of these companies may already have (proprietary) programs ins-
talled that need to be taken into account. In the end, an open source strategy
could even be a guarantee of means (maximum use of free software), but not
a guarantee of the results (use of only free software), unless the customer
requests this, since in this situation, he keeps the last word.
Two kinds of firms use FLOSS today : newcomers who specialize in FLOSS
architecture, using FLOSS as vertical (price) and horizontal differentiation asset,
and incumbents, such as IBM for its service activities (34). Traditional service
firms like Cap Gemini are more agnostic with regard to the technologies used
and the intellectual property regime involved. They will generally follow the cus-
tomers’ demand which depends on their ability to keep up with the development
of the project. These customers are most often large organizations, skilled com-
puter users that are receptive to the opportunity to integrate the most advanced
software components, developed under open licenses. So they are becoming
increasingly involved in FLOSS as the market grows and matures (35).
(34) as explained by Slatter (1992), one of the main strategies for newcomers in technological
markets is technological differentiation. Basing its offer on new FLOSS products can be
seen as a way for new service companies to differentiate.
(35) In 2005 Gartner forecasted that in « 2008, 95 percent of Global 2000 organizations will
have formal open-source acquisition and management strategies  » (http://www.gartner.
com/DisplayDocument?doc_cd=125868)
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Table 1 below summarizes the main types of users likely to be found in each
sub-sector of the IT industry (see table 1, next page).
empirical observation about firms’ involvement in FLOSS development can be
summarize as so : in the fields where dominant user’s skill is either high or very
low, firms have invested into FLOSS. When dominant user’s skill is intermedia-
te, the dominant design remains that of the classical proprietary model. More pre-
cisely, when dominant user’s skill is low, competition is price-based and FLOSS
helps to provide a cheap solution. When dominant user’s skill is high, competi-
tion is on quality, services and scalability, and FLOSS, because it is modular,
helps to design (so with complementary investments from firms), a better offer.
But between these two polar cases, for dominant user rewarding quality for a low-
medium price, FLOSS may not be a good alternative to proprietary solutions.
as shown by Jullien & Zimmermann (2011), when dominant user’s skill is
high, the variation of investment into FLOSS development and communities
among firms, can be explained, in the spirit of Teece (1986), Teece et al. (1997).
as far as business packages are concerned, the specific asset of the producer
lies in its package knowledge and in its capacity to manage the dynamics of
evolution. This makes the open sourcing of a software the specific asset of the
firm which owns it : on the technology markets where the customers are com-
puting developers, revealing the code facilitates cooperation. The producer
organizes the collaboration in a « symbiotic » relationship (using the terms of
Dahlander et Magnusson, 2005). Developers (possibly companies using the
tool), by providing their own innovations, are thereby assured that their needs
will be taken into account more rapidly and integrated into the product, a cru-
cial point to reduce their costs (von Hippel, 1988) ; from the producer’s point
of view, this decreases the r&D cost as the users provide him/her with new
feature requirements and, more original, implementation ; on the other hand,
only the one who integrates contributions is capable of verifying and of gua-
ranteeing their correct functioning and to help clients to use it. So, a FLOSS
based package model means that the firms which publish the software remain
heavily involved in its development in order to control it. as their core com-
petence lies on the management of the software edited, the companies should
only invest in the software they edit, and the involvement of salaried develo-
pers in other projects should not be encouraged.
as far as architects are concerned, to be able to integrate knowledge and
innovation from the open-source communities, they have to develop internally
efficient capabilities of absorption, an essential condition to capitalize and
internalize the communities’ contribution and the users’ feedbacks to improve
their own product quality. Dahlander et Magnusson (2008) working on the
relations between firms and open-source communities show that these firms
need « to develop sufficient absorptive capacity to benefit from external deve-
lopments, not only to identify useful external knowledge, but also to assimila-
te and apply it ». This is what has been called a « commensalistic approach »
(Dahlander et Magnusson, 2005). This corresponds to the more general asser-
tion from Cohen et Levinthal (1989, 1990) about the necessity for a firm to
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make internal efforts of r&D to be a prerequisite for the absorption of exter-
nal technology. This reflects a change in the technologies used, thus of the
complementary assets these firms need to manage, more than in the core com-
petences. Traditional architect firms are not involve in FLOSS development, as
they do not use these technologies. But they may have other processes for
monitoring the evolution of the complementary asset, the technologies they
use. They may participate in editors’ training sessions, or conclude « global
alliance » with their key partners, as Cap Gemini does (36).
Source : from Jullien & Zimmermann 2009.
TAble 1 : The dominant user type in each IT sub-sector
Actors/
products
Dominant
user type
Comments
Components vH Component producers supply hardware manufacturers, aware of
the quality and quality-price aspects of the components they will
use, as well as the effects of brand reputation of these latter as a
signal of quality for their own products.
Servers vH The clients are computer-literate people, able to express needs in
technical terms, to develop software for their own needs, and to
innovate by themselves.
High Quality
Computers
KM HQC users are somewhat less computer-literate than server users;
they can be characterized as «intensive frontier users». So the mar-
ket is looking at a good performance-to-price ratio.
Low Price
Computers
N +. KM LPC is a mass market; users have no particular skill except in the
case of intermediation by a «prescriber».
PCT N + KM PCT and players are relatively mass markets, but some advanced
users (more in the PCT field and particularly in the PDa market)
can play a constructive role in the development of new features.
Players N
Platform
producers
KM + N For the OS, as for hardware components, most of the end-users buy
a computer with an OS already installed. So the actual users in our
sense of the term are computer manufacturers, service companies
and sophisticated end-users capable of installing an alternative
operating system for their proper use or the use of their customers.
On other platforms (database, middleware), the users are also com-
puter manufacturers, service companies and highly-skilled users.
Business
solution
producers
vH/KM
depending
on the
markets
In the business solutions market, users are professionals. They are
able to make a technical evaluation of the product, to carry out
trials and tests. This means that people may have skills in the func-
tional domain (what they want, how the software works), and
sometimes in the technical one (able to adapt or develop software
to meet their own needs, especially in the tools for computer pro-
fessionals market).
architects N (+vH) Large firms and organizations include very sophisticated users (IT
division). SMes or corporate divisions, at local or sectorial level,
are clients of very heterogeneous but rather low IT skills.
However, clients may be quite precise in the definition of the ser-
vices they need, and so in the specification of the application cha-
racteristics.
(36) http://www.capgemini.com/services-and-solutions/by-industry/retail/alliances/ for classi-
cal alliance, and http://searchsystemschannel.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,
sid99_gci1261207,00.html with those done with open source world.
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V. — CONCLUSION. LESSONS FOR OPEN INNOVATION REGIMES
The FLOSS movement has sometimes been presented as a canonical model
of production for the open innovation paradigm (Chesbrough, 2003), and even
for the knowledge society. If so, open development may develop in fields
where users are skilled enough to initiate the development of open knowledge
and have enough market power to force the traditional producers to shift to an
open model. The major risk in this model is of killing the goose that lays the
golden eggs, discouraging individual participation through over-control or
non-cooperative behavior.
These conditions being respected, the open IP regime can be seen as a very
efficient solution to the Schumpeterian dilemma, in so far as it permits a wide
diffusion of knowledge, while favoring innovation, as producers are encoura-
ged to contribute to the development of the product they use/sell.
This regime could be called the « vH open innovation regime », in reference
to von Hippel’s seminal work on users as innovators (von Hippel, 1988). Open
initiatives have been launched in many industries, such as biotech, remote sen-
sing and chip design. Their chances of success are usually evaluated in terms of
the motivation of the participants and the stability of the « community ». Our
contribution argues for more economic aspects to be taken into account.
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